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OPENING THE DOOR TO THE GRAND JURY:
ABANDONING SECRECY FOR SECRECY'S SAKE
George Edward Dazzo
INTRODUCrION

The grand jury in the United States is hailed by its proponents as an
indispensable buffer of protection from malicious and unfounded prosecution by
the State. Critics, however, liken the investigatory body to a rubber stamp of the
prosecutor, analogous to early English grand jurors who were subject to the
influences of the Monarch. Criticism of the grand jury often focuses on the grand
jury's potential for oppression rather than protection of the individual.' In
particular, it is the secrecy of the grand jury that sparks the most debate.'
Fundamental to the American judicial system is the belief that disclosure of
relevant evidence is essential to the true administration of justice.' Disclosure, in
the context of a pre-trial request for a transcript of grand jury testimony, is
extremely valuable in the criminal setting where the defendant seeks to discover
testimony, spoken in secret before a grand jury, that forms the basis of the
accusation against him. For the first eight centuries of the grand jury's
development, however, disclosure of grand jury testimony was the exception rather
than the rule. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court' and Congress0 have recognized
that there are instances when disclosure of grand jury transcripts is appropriate. In
the District of Columbia, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 6(e), pretrial
disclosure of grand jury transcripts is contingent upon a defendant showing a
"particularized need."
The question of the appropriateness of disclosing grand jury testimony to the
1. See, e.g., Melvin P. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury, Benighted Supergo'ernment. 51 A.B.A.J. 153,
154 (1965) ("It simply is not true that the grand jury system protects the individual from oppression; indeed.
it has a far greater potentiality as an instrument of oppression."). See also. Leon Friedman. Grand Juries:
Strange Doings by the 'Honest Countrymen.' N.Y. TimsES, Nov. 7. 1971. Section 4. at 8 col. I (commenung on
the use and abuse of the grand jury during the Nixon Administration).
2.

See William J. Knudsen, Jr., PretrialDisclosure of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH. L

Rav. 423, 424 (1973); Anthony Murray and Richard Conway. Pretrial Discovery of Federal Grand Jury
Minutes, 49 Los ANGELES BAR. BuLL. 172, 173-74 (1974).

3.

Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855. 870 (1966).

4.

See id. at 868-75; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).

5. See the JENCKs AcT, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1988). The Jencks Act provides that after a government
witness has testified at trial on direct examination, the defendant is entitled to review prior statements by the
witness in the government's control, including grand jury testimony.
6.

United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 53 (D.C. 1981).
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criminal defendant, prior to trial, is hotly debated. Proponents of more liberal
disclosure believe, among other things, that a defendant should be entitled to
disclosure: (1) to place the opposing parties on a more level playing field;7 (2) to
enable both parties to more thoroughly prepare for trial and thus place the court in
a better position to ascertain the truth;8 and (3) to provide a check on the
prosecution's close control over the grand jury.9 Those who argue in favor of the
present rule of limited disclosure contend, however, that disclosure would provide
the defendant with an unfair advantage, in light of the fact that the defendant
cannot be compelled to disclose incriminating testimony. 10 Opponents of liberal

disclosure also argue that giving a defendant access to grand jury transcripts
would enable her to manufacture a defense, or tamper with or intimidate
witnesses."
In Davis v. United States," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
addressed the disclosure issue. Prior to the decision, the particularized need
standard applied to a defendant's pretrial request for grand jury transcripts of a
witness,' 3 but did not apply to a witness' request for the transcript of her grand

7.

William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
U. L.Q. 279, 286 ("Criminal discovery would be one tool whereby [defendants] would have a better
chance to meet on more equal terms what the state, at its leisure and without real concern for expense, gathers
to convict them.").
8. C. Zachary Seltzer, Pre-TrialDiscovery of Grand Jury Testimony in Criminal Cases, 66 DIcK. L.
REv. 379, 401 (1962) ("Since the truth is best revealed by a decent opportunity to prepare in advance of trial,
no harm can come to the state from a full disclosure of the facts.").
9. See Murray & Conway, supra note 2, at 204 ("The policy of grand jury secrecy, originally designed
as a defendant's protection, has now become a prosecutor's weapon. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment grand jury
'guarantee' itself is now invoked only by the prosecution.").
10. See, State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (N.J. 1953) ("[I]n view of the defendant's constitutional
and statutory protections against self-incrimination, the State has no right whatsoever to demand an inspection
of any of his documents or take his deposition, or to submit interrogatories to him."). But see Developments In
the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1062 (1961) ("The advantages conferred upon the defendant by
his procedural rights and constitutional protections tend to be counterbalanced by the great advantages of the
prosecution in gathering information as well as by the investigatory powers of the grand jury.").
11. Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 228, 228
(1964) ("Those who oppose pretrial discovery fear ... that the defendant would misuse discovery to subvert
the prosecution's case by resorting to perjury and witness-tampering .... ").
12. 641 A.2d 484 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1384 (1995).
13. The D.C. Court of Appeals first applied the "particularized need" standard in Alexander, 428 A.2d
at 53.
WASH.
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jury testimony. 4 In denying a defense alibi witness"' access to her grand jury
testimony, the court analyzed the witness's request under the presumption that the

defendant would use the testimony as "a hedge against impeachment."" Thus, the
court's concern that the witness would share the transcripts with the defendant
17
required the court to treat the witness and defendant as indistinguishable.
Because this was a case of first impression in the District, the court framed the
issue as whether the "particularized need" standard applicable to criminal
defendants under United States v. Alexander"8 also applied to a trial witness's
request for her grand jury testimony. In observing the need for secrecy as a
protective function to be abandoned only when necessary to "avoid a possible
injustice," 119 the court concluded that the standard should apply to grand jury

witnesses as well. After determining that the standard had not been met, the court
20
denied the witness's request.
This Note will argue that the courts should abandon the use of the

"particularized need" standard to determine when a criminal defendant can gain
pretrial access to transcripts of grand jury testimony.21 Instead, the courts should

employ a more liberal balancing test that would afford criminal defendants a
presumptive pretrial right to transcripts of grand jury testimony. The presumptive
right could then be weighed against a showing by the prosecution that disclosure
would be contrary to the interests of justice, or that factors exist which outweigh
the defendant's need for the transcript. 22 This balancing test would enable a
14. Although grand jury witnesses do not ordinarily gain access to the transcript of their grand jury
testimony, the Davis court noted that they are not among the "category of persons sworn to secrecy" (citing
D.C. SutEs. CT. CRI. R. 6(e)(2)), and are thus free to discuss their grand jury testimony (citing In Re
Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 217 (5th Cir. 1980)). Davis, 641 A.2d at 492, Because the District's
rule 6(e) is nearly identical to FED. R. CRINS. P. 6(e). the D.C. Court of Appeals loaks to federal court
decisions interpreting the federal rule. Davis, 641 A.2d at 490.
15. Although it was Ms. Mosby, Davis's girlfriend and alibi %itness. who made the request to see her
grand jury testimony, Davis's attorney initiated the request before the court. Davis. 641 A2d at 490.
16. Id. at 493.
17. Id at 491 n.18 ("For the purpose of this appeal, we review the request for disclosure of grand jury
testimony as a request by Ms. Mosby. We note, however, that it would be possible, given the posture of this
case, to view the request as originating with [the] appellant himself.").
18. 428 A.2d 42 (D.C. 1981).
19. Davis, 641 A.2d at 492 (quoting Alexander, 428 A.2d at 53).
20. Id. at 493.
21. Because the court of appeals' primary reason for applying the "particularized need" standard was
the witness's relationship with the defendant and how the defendant might use the transcript. this Note Aill
focus on the defendant's pretrial access to grand jury testimony.
22. This balancing test is similar to the test applied in In re Sealed Motion. 880 F 2d 1367 (D.C Cir.
1989) where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a 'sitness had
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defendant to better prepare for trial, inform the defendant of the evidence against
her, and allow the defendant adequate opportunity to investigate the facts. By
permitting the prosecution to rebut the defendant's presumptive right, the integrity
of the grand jury could still be maintained, specifically in instances where there
are ongoing investigations against other unindicted individuals, or where there is
evidence that the defendant may attempt to tamper with or intimidate witnesses.

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND JURY
A.

English Origins and Importation Into the Colonies

The origins of the grand jury can be traced back to England prior to the settling
of North America.2" At the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, King Henry II provided
that twelve knights or "twelve good or lawful men" of every hundred, and four
lawful men of each vill, 24 disclose under oath the names of those in the community
believed to be guilty of criminal offenses.2 5 While the initial role of the panel was
to initiate, based upon their own beliefs and knowledge, accusations against
individuals suspected of criminal wrongdoing, the panel gradually began to initiate
accusations at the direction of the King. 8
Over time the grand jury became the primary accusing body, generally

a presumptive right of access to the transcript of her grand jury testimony "absent a clear showing by the
government that other interests outweigh the witness's right to [the] transcript." Id. at 1371.
The Davis court distinguished Sealed Motion, however, because in that case, the witness' request was for
a transcript of testimony given before a grand jury convened by an independent counsel. Davis, 641 A.2d at
491. The court noted that this was significant because under the Independent Counsel Act of 1987, 28 U.S.C.
§ 591 et seq., an investigation by an independent counsel concludes with a published report which may contain
the names of individuals who testified before the grand jury, and thus it was reasonable to provide witnesses
with a copy of their testimony to "prepare written comments to the Counsel's report." Id. (quoting Sealed
Motion, 880 F.2d at 1370.
In distinguishing the facts in Davis from those in Sealed Motion, the Davis court concluded that the
"presumptive right rule" should not apply where a witness in a criminal case requests a transcript of her grand
jury testimony. Davis, 641 A.2d at 492. What the court failed to consider, however, is that the same
"presumptive right" approach of Sealed Motion is currently used in several states as a means of providing the
defendant with a automatic access to a transcript of all grand jury testimony pertaining to his indictment. See
infra part IV.B.
23. RICHARD D. YOUNGER. THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941
at 1 (1963).
24. A "vill" was an English village. Id.
25. Id.
26. GEORGE J.EDWARDS, JR.. THE GRAND JURY: AN ESSAY 25-28 (AMS Press Inc. 1973) (1906).
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operating to serve the particular political or social objectives of the King." In the
grand jury's early stages of development, the same grand jurors who handed down
the accusation against the accused also determined her guilt or innocence. The fact
that the King had enormous influence over the grand jurors afforded little
protection to the accused, and on occasion even the grand jurors themselves
28
became subject to reprisal.
The grand jury was among the many British innovations the colonists imported
during the settling of North America. 29 They were quick to take advantage of its

considerable powers. During the revolutionary period, the colonists turned the
grand jury against the English Royal Governors by often refusing to indict rebels
for acts taken against the Crown." While the grand jury was not without its
problems, 31 it became embedded in the framework of the fledgling nation and was
2
eventually guaranteed in federal prosecutions by constitutional amendment.
B.

The History of Secrecy of Grand Jury Proceedings

As an instrument of the court, the grand jury's obligation was to ferret out
wrongdoers and bring them to justice. But as the investigatory arm of the King,
the grand jury was generally expected to do the King's bidding. Eventually,
however, grand juries grew wise of their susceptibility to Royal abuse. An incident
illustrative of the clashing of these conflicting obligations was the refusal of an
English grand jury to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury and Stephen Colledge on

27. See Janice S. Peterson, Note, FederalRule of Criminal Procedure6(e): Criminalor Civil Contempt
for Violations of Grand Jury Secrecy?, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 251 n.30 (1990).
28. Id. at 251-52. Grand jurors who did not vote to find the accused guilty angered the King and could
be fined, imprisoned, or both. Id.
29. YOUNGER, supra note 23, at 2.
30. 1 SARAH S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON. GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:03. at 15 (1986).
During the tumultuous events leading up to the American Revolution, colonial grand jurors refused to indict
John Peter Zenger for libel, the leaders of the Stamp Act Rebellion, and the editors of the Boston Glob: for
libelling the Royal Governor. Not surprisingly, the colonial grand jurors were vigorous in their pursuit of
indictments against British soldiers. Id.
31. Id. at 14. Among the most pressing problems American grand juries confronted as absenteeism. So
severe was the problem that the Virginia Assembly passed a law imposing a fine of 200 pounds of tobacco on
the absentee grand juror for her failure to appear. Maryland followed suit by imposing a fine of 500 pounds of
tobacco on a Sheriff who failed to impanel a grand jury. Id.
32. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
No persons shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger[.)
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charges of treason for their opposition to Charles II's efforts to re-establish the
Catholic Church. 33
In the Earl of Shaftesbury saga, the King requested that the proceedings be
conducted in public. The grand jurors rejected this request, with one of them
stating that the secrecy was necessary to prevent the possibility that openness
might prompt the "suspects to flee. 134 The grand juror added that "it could
prejudice the state by providing the defendant with foreknowledge of all the state's
evidence ...

and [that] it could impair the ability and willingness of the jurors to

examine the evidence comprehensively, 'and without favour or affection.' "5 In
refusing to comply with the King's request and thus winning the right to conduct
their inquiry in secret, the grand jurors advanced the now common understanding
that the grand jury was not only a safeguard by which the rights of the accused
were protected, but that it was also an institution that would remain free from the
influences of the State.36 The need for secrecy appears deeply embedded in this
development.
The concerns expressed by the grand jurors during the Earl of Shaftesbury
ordeal are reflected in what has become the American policy rational for
maintaining the secrecy of the grand jury." The modern version is remarkably
similar to the concerns voiced by the Shaftesbury grand jurors:
(1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to
prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the
grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witness who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by
it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have
information with respect to the commission of crimes; and

33. BLANCHE D. BLANK, THE NOT So GRAND JURY: THE STORY OF THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY
SYSTEM 5 (1993).
34. 2 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 30 § 7:02, at 5. While the King eventually was able to get an

indictment against Colledge, Shaftesbury managed to flee England and avoid indictment. The foreman of the
grand jury that refused to indict Shaftesbury and Colledge was arrested and also forced to flee the country.
Pe.erson, supra note 27, at 252 n.38.
35. 1 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 30 § 1:03, at 5-6 (citation omitted).
36. Knudsen, supra note 2, at 426.
37. Id. at 442.
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(5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing

trial where there was no probability of guilt.38

11.
A.

DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY TESTimONY

Methods of Disclosure Under District of Columbia Law 1'

A criminal defendant seeking access to grand jury transcripts generally may
proceed under three alternatives. First, if the prosecution witness has testified at
trial on direct examination, the defendant is entitled to review the witness's grand
jury testimony prior to cross-examining the witness.40 Second, the defendant is
entitled to copies of any statements made by the defendant, including grand jury
testimony, which are in the possession of the government. 41 Third, if the motion for
disclosure of grand jury testimony is for the testimony of a witness other than the
defendant, and such motion is made prior to trial, a defendant is entitled to review
the testimony pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 6(e).4 2 The court of
appeals has interpreted Rule 6(e) to require that the party seeking disclosure

38. The policy reasons underlying the American rule of grand jury secrecy %ere first articulated in
United States v. Amazon Industrial Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931), and subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court in Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681 n.6. (quoting United States v. Rose. 215 F.2d 617.
628-29 (3d Cir. (1954)).
39. Since Alexander v. United States, 428 A.2d 42 (D.C. 1981), four D.C. Court of Appeals decisions
have addressed the disclosure issue: Davis v. United States, 641 A.2d 484 (D.C. 1994) (denying disclosure for
failure to outweigh historical policy interests); Johnson v. United States. 616 A.2d 1216, 1237 n.36 (D.C.
1992) (denying disclosure for failure to demonstrate "strong showing of particularized need"); Law v. United
States, 488 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1985) (remanded to trial court for in camera inspection to determine if need
outweighs policy of secrecy); Salim v. United States, 480 A.2d 710 (D.C. 1984) (remanded to trial court to
determine if particularized need demonstrated to outweigh policy in favor of secrecy).
40. THE JENCKS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1988). See also Davis, 641 A.2d at 489 ("The Jencks Act
is another method by which an accused may secure information in the possession of the prosecutor.").
41. D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 16(a)(l)(A). Rule 16(a)(l)(A) entities the defendant to recorded
transcripts of his grand jury testimony. However, the rule does not apply to the grand jury testimony of
witnesses other than the defendant. In Davis, the request for grand jury transcripts %as that of a %itncss and
thus Rule 16 was inapplicable. Davis, 641 A.2d at 489 & n.14.
42. Rule 6(e)(1) provides that "any transcript prepared (from grand jur testimon)! .. shall remain in
the custody or control of attorney for the government unless othertse ordered b) the Court in a parttcular
case." See also Davis, 641 A.2d at 490; Johnson v. United States, 616 A.2d 1216. 1237 n.36 (D.C. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1611 (1993); Alexander. 428 A.2d at 53.
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demonstrate a "particularized need" that outweighs the historical policy
3
considerations in favor of continued secrecy.'
In determining whether to release the transcript of grand jury testimony under
the "particularized need" standard, courts look to whether the material is needed
in order to avoid an injustice in another judicial proceeding," whether the request
is structured to cover only the minimum material necessary,'4 and whether the
need for the material outweighs the need for continued secrecy.' 0 Courts apply the
five policy interests by balancing the defendant's request for disclosure against the
continued need for maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.' 7 Of the
three elements necessary to satisfy the "particularized need" standard,
outweighing the public interest in secrecy is the element which predominates
"particularized need" analysis.4 8 Only when the defendant demonstrates to the
43. Davis, 641 A.2d at 491 ("The court is to order the pretrial release of a grand jury transcript only
when 'the party seeking disclosure has established a particularized need that outweighs time-worn
considerations.'" (quoting Alexander, 428 A.2d at 53)).
44. This element is often overlooked by courts in their eagerness to get to the "policy of secrecy
analysis." Often courts will enumerate the standard from Douglas Oil but deny disclosure on the basis that
the requesting party failed to demonstrate a "particularized need" i.e., failed to show that his need for the
transcripts outweighed the policy of grand jury secrecy. See In Re Grand Jury, 942 F.2d at 1195 (listing
Douglas Oil factors but concluding that "[t]he secrecy of the grand jury is not to be pierced by... a slender
reed"); Hernly v. United States, 832 F.2d 980, 984 (7th Cir. 1987) (listing Douglas Oil factors but concluding
"[allthough it can happen that the need for secrecy may be accorded less weight than the need for disclosure,
the latter must have been shown to exist"); Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, (7th Cir. 1984) (listing
Douglas Oil factors but characterizing the standard as "whether the benefit of disclosure to the party seeking
it clearly outweighs the costs to the interests that are served by keeping grand jury proceedings secret").
45. The Supreme Court has yet to enumerate the criteria which will satisfy this element. The Court has,
however, made clear that the standard will not permit "wholesale discovery and production of a grand jury
transcript." Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 683. Rather, a party seeking disclosure must demonstrate that he
needs the transcript for a "particular" purpose. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 217.
46. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222 (footnote omitted).
47. 2 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 30 § 7.10, at 53-54. See also Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 223 (stating
that trial court's duty in deciding disclosure requests is "to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of
the relevant circumstances and the standards announced by [the Supreme Court]."); Dennis, 384 U.S. at 870
(maintaining that particularized need standard requires that "the secrecy of the proceedings be lifted
discretely and limitedly." (quoting Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 683)).
48. See. e.g., Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 223 (recognizing that interest in secrecy is reduced but not
eliminated where grand jury proceedings have concluded); Pittsburgh Platd Glass, 360 U.S. at 399
(concluding that defendant's asserted "right" to transcript "r[an] counter to long-established policy of secrecy
...older than our Nation itself"); Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682 (stating "there are instances where the
need will outweigh the countervailing policy [b]ut they must be shown with particularity"); United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 519 (1943) (concluding that allowing "intrusion[s] into the indispensable secrecy of
grand jury's proceedings ... would subvert the functions of federal grand juries").
Although all three factors are significant and must be satisfied in order for disclosure to be granted, the
"particularized need" analysis in Davis consisted entirely of "policy of secrecy" analysis. See Davis, 641 A.2d

GRAND JURY SECRECY

court that his need for the transcript outweighs the policy of secrecy will pretrial
disclosure be granted."'

The Supreme Court has held that the "particularized need" standard requires a
showing of "compelling necessity" 80 and that the trial court is vested with
"substantial discretion" in determining whether the requisite burden has been
met. 51 Although the standard itself offers no bright-line test, the courts do not
82
want for a lack of precedent upon which to rely.
The longstanding application of the "particularized need" standard has
produced substantial precedent which identifies the circumstances in which
disclosure will or will not be granted. The mere need for the transcript solely for
discovery purposes is insufficient to warrant disclosure.53 Disclosure will not be
granted where the request amounts to nothing more than a "fishing" expedition."
Disclosure is usually not justified where the party seeks to avoid impeachment at
trial. 55 Even the termination of grand jury proceedings may not justify disclosure.00
at 488-93.
49. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 211 ("It is clear from Proctor & Gamble and Dennis that disclosure is
appropriate only in those cases where the need for [the transcript] outweighs the public interest in secrecy.
and that the burden of demonstrating this balance rest upon the [defendant] seeking disclosure.").
Although the "policy of secrecy" is but one of three elements, it is arguably the most difficult to meet.
See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
50. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682 ("[Tlhe 'indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings' must
not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity." quoting United States v. Johnson. 319 U.S. 503.
513 (1943)).
51. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 223 ("[A] court called upon to determine whether grand jury transcripts
should be released necessarily is infused with substantial discretion.").
52. See 2 BEAL & BRYSON, supra note 30 § 7.10, at 54.
53. See United States v. Sells Eng'g, 463 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1983) (holding trial court's disclosure of
transcript based on rational relation to pending civil suit "insufficient for consideration under the proper legal
standard"); Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682 (rejecting "relevancy and usefulness" alone without showing
of prejudice to defendant as insufficient to justify disclosure); In Re Disclosure of Evidence. 650 F.2d 599. 602
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding state district attorney not entitled to disclosure of transcript simpl) because it was
" 'convenie[nt]"' and would "aid in the investigation of state criminal violations"); In Re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962) (rejecting disclosure based on showing of usefulness to go-ernment
agency); See also 2 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 30 § 7.10. at 57 ("If ease and access to relevant
information were the test, the showing of "particularized need" could be made in virtually any case .
").
54. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special September 1986, 942 F.2d 1195. 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding district court abused its discretion in granting disclosure request where circuit court characterized
request as "fishing for testimony that possibly might produce evidence beneficial to the . . . [case]**.
55. Dennis, 384 U.S. at 855 (rejecting request for disclosure as an effort to avoid impachment). Davis,
641 A.2d at 493 (characterizing disclosure request as not aimed at discovery, but rather "primarily ... a
hedge against impeachment"); Alexander, 428 A.2d at 54 (finding defendant's purpose for disclosure was "to
think about and explain any inconsistencies between... grand jury testimony and .. present recollections-).
56. 2 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 30 § 7.10. at 55. See United States v. Sobotka. 623 F.2d 764, 767
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Among the instances in which disclosure is likely to be granted are: where
necessary to impeach a witness,

57

where necessary to refresh the recollection of a

witness,58

where the grand jury witness consents,5 9 where the request is made by a
government agency,60 and perhaps where the materials needed can only be
obtained from the grand jury." Although courts have recognized that "disclosure
rather than suppression . . . ordinarily promotes the proper administration of

criminal justice,"

2

the burden of outweighing the five policy interests is "a heavy

one to overcome." 63

m.
A.

DAVIS V. UNITED STATES

Background

Emmanuel Davis ("Davis") was tried on one count of rape while armed, one
count of carnal knowledge with a minor, and other offenses. 6 ' At trial, Davis
asserted a defense of misidentification and alibi.6 5 In support of his alibi defense,

(2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting government's argument that where grand jury returns indictment, most policy
reasons are "no longer present").
57. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. at 400 ("This Court has long held that there are occasions
when the trial judge may . . . order the minutes of grand jury testimony produced for use on . . . cross-

examination."); United States v. McMahon, 938 F.2d 1501 (lst Cir. 1991) (holding government's use of
transcript to impeach witness created particularized need for defense to use transcript for rehabilitation).
58. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. at 404 (noting the standard practice of government attorneys
using grand jury transcripts to "refresh the recollection of government witnesses at trial") (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
59. See In Re Application of Executive Sec. Corp., 702 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding
disclosure of transcript where witness consented to disclosure of grand jury testimony). But see Illinois v. E.F.
Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 1984) ("If the consent of a witness before the grand jury to the
release of his grand jury testimony were sufficient to raise the veil of secrecy, this might encourage bringing
suits against such witnesses just to induce them to consent to the release of their grand jury testimony as part
of the consideration for settling the case.").
60. See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, Miller Brewing Co., 717 F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1983)
(noting that although government entities are not exempt from the Douglas Oil standard, "less leakage and
improper use of grand jury materials [is likely] when disclosed to government attorneys than private parties").
61. See Lucas v. Turner. 725 F.2d 1095, 1102 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that material requested was not available from any other source); 2 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 30 § 7.10,
at 54.
62. Dennis, 384 U.S. at 870.
63. Lucas, 725 F.2d at 1101.
64. Davis, 641 A.2d at 486.
65. Id. at 487.
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Davis called his girlfriend, Nataniah Mosby, to testify that Davis was with her
when the offenses took place.66 Ms. Mosby previously testified before the grand

jury that indicted Davis. Prior to trial, Davis's attorney requested on behalf of Ms.
Mosby, that the court permit her to review the transcripts of her grand jury

testimony. Following brief questioning, the trial court denied the disclosure
request. 7 The jury convicted Davis on all counts after an eight day trial, and he
68
was sentenced to 25 years-to-life in prison.
B.

The Opinion
The critical issue on appeal was whether the "particularized need" standard

should also be applied to a witness making a request for disclosure of grand jury
testimony. The court recognized that it could have analyzed the request as having
been made by the defendant because it was initiated by the defendant's attorney
and because the witness had told the court that she intended to share the
transcripts with the defendant.6 9 After reviewing the precedent established in

United States v. Alexander70 pertaining to a defendant's request for disclosure of a
66.
67.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Id.
Id. at 490. The following examination took place:
The defense attorney indicates that you want to make some sort of request to the court.
Yes.
Which is?
I want to see my testimony statement.
Q: Why do you want to see it?
A: No purpose, I just want it.
Q: Okay. That is the only reason you wanted to take a look at it?
A: Yes.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Do you remember the events of October 4 [the day of the rape], %hat happened?
Yes.
Is your memory shaky on that, what happened on October 4?
I remember some things.

Id.
68. Brief For Appellant at viii, Davis (No. 92-CF-1317). See also Brief For Appellee at 2 n-2
69. Davis, 641 A.2d at 491 n.18.
70. 428 A.2d 42 (D.C. 1981). In Alexander. a murder case, the defendant made a pretrial motton to
compel disclosure of the transcripts of grand jury testimony given by her tmo daughters, ages 9 and 17 The
defendant stated the reason for her motion was "to adequately prepare the daughters to become %itnesses at
trial." Id. at 52 n.28. The trial court granted the request as to the 9 )ear-old but denied the request for the 17
year-old. The court of appeals applied the "particularized need" standard announced in Proaor& Gamble
and reversed the trial court's ruling for failure to "demonstrate a particularized need justif)mg disclosure-" ld
at 54.
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witness's grand jury testimony, the court determined that the policy rationale and
case law supporting the "particularized need" standard were equally persuasive
when applied to Ms. Mosby's request. 1
In holding that the "particularized need" standard applied to witnesses as well
as defendants, the court explicitly noted its concern that if witnesses were entitled
as of right to transcripts of their grand jury testimony, defendants might also have
access to the transcripts through witnesses who were willing to do so "for the sole
purpose of benefitting the defendant. 7' 2 The court was concerned not only with the
reason the witness wanted the transcript, but also that the defendant might use the
transcript as a means of explaining any previous testimonial inconsistencies, or
tailoring a defense to match the grand jury testimony.73
C. Analysis
The Davis court relied on Alexander. Alexander, in turn, relied on several
Supreme Court decisions requiring a party seeking access to grand jury transcripts
to demonstrate a "particularized need" before the court would order disclosure. 7
A critical element in the Supreme Court's application of the "particularized need"
standard was the policy considerations in support of the need for continued
secrecy.7" The Davis opinion demonstrates the application of the standard even

71. Davis, 641 A.2d at 491. The court stated that it was "more persuaded by the reasoning in
Alexander and the application of the particularized need standard" and rejected Davis's attorney's argument
that a witness should enjoy a presumptive right of access to a transcript of her grand jury testimony. Id.
72. Id. at 492 (emphasis omitted).
73. Id. The court characterized the witness's request as an effort by the defendant to "circumvent the
precedent established by this court in Alexander" adding that the request was nothing more than "a hedge
against impeachment." Id.
The court's concern regarding what Davis would do with the transcript is in contrast to the call of many
scholars and commentators who argue that the fear is unfounded. See, William Brennan, The Criminal
Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279; Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury
Secrecy, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 455 (1965); Goldstein, The State and the Accused; Balance of Advantage In
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); William J. Knudsen, Jr., Pretrial Disclosure of Federal
Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REv. 423 (1973); Anthony Murray & Richard Conway, Pretrial
Discovery of Federal Grand Jury Minutes, 49 Los ANGELES BAR BULL. 172 (1974); Arthur H. Sherry, The
Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668 (1962); Note, Criminal Pretrial Discovery: In Search of
the "Plain Mandate" of the Rule Governing the States Obligation to Furnish Minutes of Testimony, 34
DRAKE L. REV. 795 (1985).
74. Alexander, 428 A.2d at 53-54 (citing Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1970);
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395
(1959); United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958)).
75. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218-19 ("[W]e have noted several distinct interests served by
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when most historical reasons for refusing disclosure are not present, and also
demonstrates that the effect of the standard is to generally keep the door to the

grand jury open only to the prosecution.
The Davis court applied the "particularized need" standard to the witness'

request even after it conceded that all but one of the policy reasons were not
pertinent."6 The court's holding rested on the premise that "a rule according a

witness a presumptive right to a transcript of her grand jury testimony would
afford the defense access to the grand jury testimony of that witness who, for the

77
sole purpose of benefitting the defendant, was willing to make such a request."

This premise, combined with the court's "policy of secrecy" concern that Davis
might commit perjury or tamper with Ms. Mosby's testimony at trial, led the court
to conclude that Davis "failed to establish the second prong of the Alexander test,
which requires a showing that the need for disclosure is greater than any
continuing need for secrecy."78 But the court assumed, without support in the
record that: (1) the defendant, rather than counsel, would be using the transcript
of Ms. Mosby's testimony; and (2) defense counsel would willingly assist the
defendant in committing perjury or manufacturing a defense.
The court's assumption, however, in denying the disclosure request to avoid
"subornation of perjury or tampering with . ..witnesses," begs the question.70
How can the court be certain disclosure is likely to result in perjury or tampering
when disclosure is the exception rather than the rule? 80
safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. [lf prcindictment proceedings were made public
many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward... witnesses who appeared before the grand
jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly .. . [and there would be a) risk that those about to be
indicted would flee or would try to influence the individual grand jurors to vote against indictment."). See also
PittsburghPlate Glass Co.. 360 U.S. at 400 ("To make public any part of its proceedings would inevitably
detract from the [grand jury's] efficacy."); Dennis, 384 U.S. at 869 ("This Court has recognized the 'longestablished policy that maintains the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.' ") (quoting Proctor & Gamble. 356
U.S. at 681).
76. Davis, 641 A.2d at 492. While acknowledging that "many of the traditional reasons for protecting
the secrecy of grand jury transcripts... [were] not implicated" the court was concerned about the possibility
of "subornation of perjury or tampering with the witness who may testify before Ithe grand jury and later
appear at the trial of those indicted by it." Id. See also Alexander. 428 A.2d at 54
77. Davis, 641 A.2d at 492.
78. Id. at 492-93.
79. Id. at 492.
80. See Calkins, supra note 73, at 469 ("The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such an
opportunity is no reason for committing the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of cleanng
himself" (quoting Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 47, 63) (remarks of Dean Wigmore)). See also
Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 47, 62 ("[Hlow can we be so positive criminal discory will
produce perjured defenses when we have in this country virtually shut the door on all such discovery"").
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The court also disregarded the significance of the prosecution's exclusive control
over the grand jury transcript. Although the court noted that "the government has
'
use of the [transcript] in preparing for trial"81
while the defendant does not, and
that "this asymmetry is built into our criminal justice system," 82 the court did not
believe that this was significant enough to question the appropriateness of the
standard. This one-sided access in favor of the prosecution however, was never
intended to be the basis for the policy of grand jury secrecy and the
"particularized need" standard. 83 If the purpose of a trial is to search for the truth,
then it would seem to logically follow that in our adversarial system the truth can
8
be best ascertained by placing both parties on a level playing field. '
The opinion is typical of the application of the "particularized need" standard.
A court will often cite the long-established policy of grand jury secrecy, and use
the history to legitimize the assumption that the defendant simply cannot be
trusted to ethically use the transcript in the preparation of her defense.88 In its
decision to keep the transcript out of the defendant's hands by keeping it away
from the witness, the court's opinion amounted to more of a reiteration of the
history of grand jury secrecy than a strong indication that the rule still has
legitimate present day applications.8 The opinion illustrates how difficult it is for a

81. Davis, 641 A.2d at 489 (citing PittsburghPlate Glass, 360 U.S. at 404 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
82. Id.
83. See Calkins, supra note 73. In examining the origins of the grand jury and the "particularized
need" standard, Calkins points out that "[i]t was not intended to aid the prosecution in its discovery of facts
or to protect the prosecution's case from disclosure." Id. at 458. See also, Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 223
(acknowledging "[iut is equally clear that as the considerations justifying secrecy become less relevant, a party
asserting a need for grand jury transcripts will have a lesser burden in showing justification."). But see United
States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). Judge Learned Hand's statement is typical of the judicial
resistance to liberal pretrial disclosure in criminal cases:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly
to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or
comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted where there is the least fair doubt in the minds of
any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to
pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see.
Id. at 649.
84. See supra note 7.
85. See Alexander, 428 A.2d at 53-54.
86. The necessity for grand jury secrecy is implicated in two aspects of the proceedings: (1) the period
of time when the grand jurors hear testimony and during deliberations and voting; and (2) when the
proceedings have concluded. The original rule of secrecy and the five policy reasons for conducting secret
proceedings were originally intended to shield the jurors during the former from external influences of the
State or the target of the investigation. See Knudsen, supra note 2, at 428; Mike E. Stevenson, Comment,
Federal Grand Jury Secrecy, 5 GONZAGA L. RaV. 255, 258 (1970).
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criminal defendant to satisfy the particularized need standard, and also raises the

question whether the defendant is at a disadvantage at trial because of the
prosecution's use of the transcript during the preparation and presentation of its
case.8" An examination of the foundation for the rule of grand jury secrecy
indicates however, that the policy interests move "verbatim, from case to case, like
a fruitcake that is passed from family to family but never cut into."88

IV.

A.

THE INTERESS SERVED BY GRAND JURY SECRECY

Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake

As discussed previously, 89 grand jury secrecy has generally been found to serve
five historical policy interests: (1) to prevent escape of the target of the grand jury;
(2) to insure freedom during deliberations; (3) to encourage free and untrammeled
testimony before the grand jury; (4) to protect the reputation of the target who is
eventually exonerated; and (5) to prevent perjury or witness tampering by those
who are indicted. 90 None of the five interests would be ill-served by a rule which
affords an indicted defendant a presumptive right of access to the grand jury
87. See Davis, 641 A.2d at 488. The court rejected this argument when raised on appeal by defense
counsel, citing D.C. SUPER. CT. CRUM. R. 6(e)(1) which requires that transcripts are to remain in the custody
or control of the attorney for the government. But in the next paragraph of the opinion the court
acknowledged that "the right of the government to . . . use the grand jury minutes is incomparably the
greatest." Id. at 489 (quoting 1 M. RHODES. ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
§ 6:123 (2d ed. 1985)), and that the grand jury record "constitutes a huge storehouse of relevant fact." Id.
(quoting United States v. Ball, 49 F.R.D. 153, 159 (E.D. Wis. 1969)). This contradiction is clearly at odds
with the notion that "disclosure, rather than suppression ... promotes the proper administration of criminal
justice." Dennis, 384 U.S. at 855. See also id. at 873 ("In our adversary system for determining guilt or
innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact.");
People v. Wimberly, 179 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Mich. 1970) (characterizing the grand jury as a "citadel" and
"the bastion of the grand jury storehouse"); I BEALE & BRYSON. supra note 30 § 1.03, at 2. In discussing the
difficulties posed by the secrecy requirements, the authors noted that "[fJor defense counsel, the problem is
that the rules of grand jury secrecy work to limit defense access to one of the most potentially fruitful sources
of discovery in a criminal case-the investigative proceedings before the grand jury that led to the
indictment." Id.
88. Fred A. Bernstein, Behind the Gray Door: lWilliams. Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury. 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 596-97 (1994). Bernstein questions why "no court has 'checked' the five AmazonProctor & Gamble reasons against the reality of a grand jury proceeding at which the suspect has already
been arrested and the only evidence presented is the hearsay testimony of a lone government agent?" Id. at
598.
89. See supra text accompanying note 38.
90. Davis, 641 A.2d at 488 (quoting Proctor & Gamble. 356 U.S. at 681-82).
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transcript.
The possibility that an individual under investigation by the grand jury might
escape prior to trial if the proceedings were made public is of great significance
while the target's indictment is being contemplated. A prosecutor or government
attorney opposing disclosure might argue that open proceedings would prejudice
the State by forewarning the target of her possible arrest and thus enable her to
flee before she could be apprehended. 9' Although it is clear that the State has a
compelling interest in maintaining the secrecy of the proceedings in order to
facilitate a swift and uncomplicated apprehension of the accused, the need for
secrecy to prevent the target's escape is arguably insignificant in circumstances
where the target is already in custody and being held without bail.9 2 Moreover,
even where the individual is released on bond, continued secrecy would have no
bearing on his ability to escape. Although the defendant might learn of the
strength of the prosecution's case from the content of the transcripts and thus be
motivated to flee the jurisdiction, it is unlikely that he would not have already
learned of this information from his attorney.
The integrity of the grand jury during the process of deliberations and voting is
also an important consideration in the "policy of secrecy" analysis. By requiring
that deliberations and voting be conducted in secret, neither side has an
opportunity to exert influence over the grand jurors before the vote is taken, or
intimidate grand jurors into voting for or against indictment. This policy interest
stems from the Earl of Shaftesbury case where the King attempted to exert Royal
influence over the grand jurors to indict Shaftesbury and Colledge. 93 But this
interest is not pertinent to the disclosure of grand jury testimony to the defendant
after indictment because a defendant would be more concerned with the content of
the testimony of witnesses who testified before the grand jury rather than what the
grand jurors said during deliberations or how they voted.
A further policy interest served by the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is to
encourage individuals who have information concerning the commission of crimes
to come forward before the grand jury without fear that their identity or testimony
will later be revealed."" A consequence of disclosure is said to be that if a
transcript of the grand jury's proceedings were made available to the defendant,

91.
92.
93.
94.

See Calkins, supra note 73, at 459.
See Murray & Conway, supra note 2, at 177.
See supra part I.B.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 400.
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witnesses would be less willing to come forward and testify before the grand jury.05
The possibility that individuals might be hesitant to testify if they knew their
testimony would be revealed to the defendant is somewhat illusory. Although the
State is generally dependent upon willing witnesses in the presentation of its case
before the grand jury and at trial,96 that does not necessarily imply that witnesses
would fear testifying simply because of the possibility that their testimony would
be disclosed to the defendant. A witness who offers incriminating information
before the grand jury can reasonably expect to be required to testify against the
defendant at trial. Thus any reluctance a witness might have for testifying before
the grand jury would more probably be based on the witness having to give that
same information in open court, in front of the defendant, and not because the
97
witness' grand jury testimony would be disclosed.
Secrecy also serves to protect the reputation of an individual who becomes a
target of the grand jury but who is later exonerated. Specifically, grand jury
secrecy shields the exonerated target from "condemnation or suspicion on the part
of friends or the public." 98 But the importance of this interest raises two issues not
affected by subsequent disclosure: an individual who is exonerated would not need
the transcripts of grand jury testimony to assist in the preparation of her defense;
and a rule against disclosure could not prevent the dissemination of information
concerning an accused's arrest when she is indicted and publicly charged with a
crime.
With regard to the first issue, the disclosure of grand jury testimony would
ordinarily not be necessary, simply because the grand jury's decision not to indict
would generally mean the exonerated individual would not be standing trial, and
thus have no need for the transcripts of grand jury testimony to assist in the
preparation of her defense. However, when a request for disclosure is made where
several individuals were investigated but one or more were exonerated, the
presiding trial judge could merely redact the names of those who were not indicted
in order to protect their identities and reputations. For individuals who are
subsequently indicted, maintaining the secrecy of the grand jury would have little
or no impact on their reputations because their arrest and trial would already be a
95. Calkins, supra note 73, at 459; Murray & Conway. supra note 2. at 199.
96. Calkins, supra note 73, at 459.
97. Id. at 461. Calkins points out that the rule of secrecy is designed primarily to protect the integrity
and functioning of the grand jury and not the witnesses who appear before it. adding. -[a] witness is not a
confidential informant," and that "[i]n revealing damaging evidence before the grand jury, the witness must
expect that such evidence will be disclosed at trial." Id.
98. Id. at 460.
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matter of public record.
Arguably the most controversial policy interest embedded in the need for
maintaining grand jury secrecy, and the only interest pertinent to the court's
analysis in Davis,9" is the possibility that pretrial disclosure of grand jury
transcripts would enable the accused to intimidate or tamper with witnesses,
commit perjury, or manufacture a defense.100

The possibility that a dishonest defendant will seek the testimony of grand jury
witnesses in order to commit perjury or to ensure that her defense will comport
with the witnesses testimony at trial are legitimate interests that must be
considered before disclosure should be made. However, as pointed out by former

Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, it is ordinarily the defense attorney, and
not the defendant, who will review the transcripts in preparation for trial.10 1 Thus,

it does not necessarily follow that, even if disclosure is granted, the accused will
have the inclination, ability, or the information necessary to manipulate the
trial. 10 2 Nor does it follow that, even if the defendant does eventually have the
opportunity to personally review the transcripts, his counsel will assist him in
misusing the testimony.103 Moreover, "if the accused is of a mind to suborn
99. Davis, 641 A.2d at 492.
100. See Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681 n.6; Rose, 215 F.2d at 628-29; Davis, 641 A.2d at 488.
See also Brennan, supra note 7, at 290; Murray & Conway, supra note 2, at 178; Traynor, supra note 11. at
228.
101. William J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 47, 63 (1963).
102. See Peter Aranella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to
Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 574 (1980). Aranella points out that "there
is simply no evidence to suggest any higher incidence of obstruction of justice or subornation of perjury"
occurs in jurisdictions granting defendants automatic access to grand jury transcripts and that some
prosecutors from those jurisdictions "have conceded that ... fears [of intimidation and perjury) have not been
borne out." Id. (citing Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, and InternationalLaw of House Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Session, pt. 1, at 33138 (1977) (statements of William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Robert J. DelTulfo, Asst.
Attorney General of New Jersey and Director of the Division of Criminal Justice)). Contra Bill Miller, Girls
Slaying a Case of Frustration:ProsecutorsLeft With I Conviction in Schoolyard Attack That Shook City,
WASH. POST, July 5, 1995, at BI, B2 (prosecutors and police in a murder case citing witness intimidation as
cause a of "difficulty . .. persuading witnesses to cooperate" and that witnesses "d[idln't want to go up
against [the defendants]").
103. Brennan, supra note 101 at 63. Justice Brennan points out that ethical defense attorneys are at
least one obstacle to the defendant's abuse of discovery:
Besides, isn't there a suggestion in the argument, and I think a rather slanderous one, that assigned
counsel cannot be trusted? After all, isn't it the defense attorney and not the accused himself who
will have access to the state's materials? Whatever justification there may be for the assumption that
the desperate accused will try anything to escape his fate, the notion that his assigned lawyer can't
wait to conspire with him to that end hardly comports, I suggest, with the foundation of trust and
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potential witnesses against him, he will have an additional opportunity to learn of
the existence of such a witness... [because] the names of these witnesses will be
available to the accused sometime before trial in any event."'10
In addition to the historical policy interests, opponents of liberal pretrial
disclosure also argue that access to grand jury testimony would give the defendant
an advantage at trial because disclosure would permit the criminal defendant to
"pick through the [g]overnment's evidence"105 in the preparation of a defense,
while at the same time, the defendant is shielded from a reciprocal discovery
obligation by the privilege against self-incrimination.101
The rebuttal argument, however, is that it is the State which has the advantage
because its exclusive control and custody of the grand jury transcripts permits the
State to use the material in preparation for trial while the defendant cannot.'0
While both points may arguably have merit, one need only look to other
jurisdictions to conclude that greater access to grand jury testimony would be
more likely to level the judicial playing field, rather than give one side an
unnecessary advantage. As Judge Posner pointed out, "California allows liberal
access to grand jury transcripts and the heavens have not fallen there yet."' 0 3 A
survey of jurisdictions which permit liberal pretrial disclosure and the rationale for
greater access to grand jury transcripts suggests that perhaps the "particularized
need" standard and the history of secrecy of the grand jury are best left to the
study of legal historians.
B. Other Jurisdictions
Among the states which do not follow the "particularized need" standard are

ethics which underlies our professional honor system.
Id.
104. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 614, 633 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.. for a unanimous Court). See
also Bernstein, supra note 88, at 620-22 (analyzing five policy interests in instances where go'ernment agents
make summary presentations of evidence to grand jury).
105. Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47. 76 (1963) (remarks of Thomas A. Flannery).
106. Id. at 90 (remarks of A. Kenneth Pye).
107. See supra notes 9 and 89.
108. State of Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Posner added,
"[tirue, some people think that the federal courts make a fetish of grand jury secrecy-that there is little
reason to preserve it after the grand jury has been discharged .... So little is kept secret no'wadays that any
participants in grand jury proceedings, whether as witnesses, jurors, or prosecutors, probably have no
expectations of long-term secrecy." Id. The rest of Judge Posner's opinion reversed the trial court's disclosure
order for failure to demonstrate a "particularized need." Id. at 593-41.
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Montana,"' Nevada,"18 North Dakota," 4
Alaska, 109 California," ° Illinois,'
and Vermont. 15 The state courts interpreting their respective statutes and rules
have concluded that access for both parties to the testimony that led to the
indictment provides both the State and defendant with ample opportunity to
investigate the facts, 16 informs the defendant of the general source and nature of
the evidence against her,2" and enables the defendant to prepare a defense.",8 The
disclosure policies of these states suggest that it is access to grand jury transcripts,
rather than continued secrecy after indictment, which is more "consonant with a
fair trial" that "promotes the administration of justice." 119

109. ALASKA CRIM. R. 6(m) (providing defendant with opportunity to listen to electronic recording of
grand jury proceedings and to obtain copies of transcript if necessary).
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1(a) (West 1985) (if indictment found, county clerk shall deliver copy of
grand jury transcript to defendant or his attorney).
111. ILL. S. Cr. RULE 412(a)(iii) (state shall disclose to defense counsel transcript of portions of grand
jury minutes containing testimony of persons whom the prosecution intends to call as a witness at trial).
112. MONT.CODE ANN. § 46-11-317(3)(c) (1993) (providing transcript available to defendant pursuant
to a proper discovery motion).
113. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 172.225(3)(c) (Michie 1992) (county clerk shall deliver copy of
transcript of grand jury proceedings to defendant or defense counsel).
114. N.D. CENT.CODE § 29-10.1-38 (Supp. 1993) (if defendant's motion for disclosure of transcript is
denied, defendant entitled to preliminary examination).
115. V. R. CR. P. 16(a)(2)(B) (prosecutor has obligation to disclose to defendant transcript of grand
jury proceedings pertaining to indictment).
116. State v. Davis, 624 P.2d 376 (Haw. 1981). By analogy, the Hawaii Supreme Court's analysis of
Hawaii's "notice of alibi rule", HAW. R. PENAL P. 12, characterized the purpose of the reciprocal discovery
obligation between the State and the defendant as "designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal
trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the
determination of guilt or innocence." Id. at 379 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970)).
117. People v. Pipes, 3 Cal. Rptr. 814, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). See State v. Bennett, 503 N.W.2d, 42,
47 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). Iowa applies a slightly different method for disclosure to the defendant. While not
providing direct access to the transcripts of grand jury testimony, IOWA CODE ANN § 813.2 Rule 4(6)(a), (b)
(West 1994) requires the prosecution to provide the defendant with "notice in writing stating the name, place
of residence, and occupation of the witness upon whose testimony the indictment is found, and a full and fair
statement of the witness's testimony before the grand jury and a full and fair statement of additional expected
testimony at trial." Id. The Iowa rule, however, has no bright line test for determining what constitutes a "full
and fair statement." See also State v. Lord, 341 N.W.2d 741, 743 (Iowa 1983) ("The [required statement]
did not alert defendant specifically to the inference at issue ...but it did advise him generally that the witness
would testify to inferences of that source and nature."); Bennett, 503 N.W.2d. at 47 ("The adequacy of
minutes must be determined on a case-by-case basis."). See generally Note, Criminal Pretrial Discovery: In
Search of the "Plain Mandate" of the Rule Governing the State's Obligation to Furnish Minutes of
Testimony, 34 DRAKE L. REv. 795 (1985) (examining problems associated with determining degree of
specificity required by a "full and fair statement").
118. People v. Sola, 19 Cal. Rptr. 327, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
119. Robles v. People, 496 P.2d. 1003, 1004 (Colo. 1972).
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The Colorado Supreme Court, in Parlapiano v. District Court, 20 recognized
that disclosure of grand jury transcripts can be accomplished in such a way as to
adequately safeguard the policy interests advanced for limited disclosure, without
directly applying the interests to automatically block disclosure to the defendant.
In rejecting the analysis of Proctor & Gamble 21 and Pittsburgh Plate Glass

Company, 22 the court found that the policy interests behind the "particularized
need" standard, while important, were generally inapplicable once an indictment
has been returned. The court held that a defendant is presumptively entitled to the
pretrial disclosure of grand jury testimony of the persons whom the government
intends to call as a witnesses at trial, but that where the policy interests are
implicated, the burden is on the government to show why disclosure should not be
granted.12 3 In recognizing the catch-22 defendants are placed in by having to
describe with particularity requested material that is being withheld, as well as the
significance of possible witness intimidation or perjured defenses, the court
determined that if any of the five policy interests were relevant, it should be the
State that has the burden to show how, and why disclosure might undermine any
1 24
of the five policy interests.

120. 491 P.2d. 965 (Colo. 1971).
121. 356 U.S. 377 (1958).
122. 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
123. Parlapiano,491 P.2d at 968.
124. Id. at 968. The court's reasoning demonstrates the dilemma of the defendant posed by the policy of
secrecy:
Secrecy for secrecy's sake should no longer be the rule. . . . Rather, the maintenance of the wall of
secrecy around grand jury testimony should be grounded upon sound reason. It might be argued that
this is not compatible with the rule requiring an advance showing by a defendant of a "particularized
need" for. . . [grand jury] testimony. The practical weakness in this argument is that the indicted
defendant and his counsel will not know what the testimony was. The cloak of secrecy thwarts an
indicted defendant's efforts to show necessity and relevancy, even when they exist.
Id. The Colorado supreme court's rationale echoes that of Chief Justice John Marshall in the trial of Aaron
Burr. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14.694). Burr requested that the court
disclose to him two letters then in President Jefferson's possession that Burr allegedly wrote to an army
general, that detailed Burr's plot to overthrow the United States government. Chief Justice Marshall grappled
with the issue of how Burr could show with particularity why he wanted the letters unless he actually saw
them first:
Now, if a paper be in possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or applicability
can be expected from the person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its contents?
If the executive possess a paper which is really believed by the accused to be material to his defence,
ought it be withheld? ... It is objected that the particular passages of the letter which are required
are not pointed out. But how can this be done while the letter itself is withheld?
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While Colorado's approach is somewhat more liberal than the federal rules,
California took liberal disclosure several steps further when, on June 5, 1990,
California voters passed Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform
Act."" 5 The Act, commonly known as California's "reciprocal discovery
statute," 126 imposes on both the prosecution and defense an obligation to disclose,
among other things, the names, addresses, and statements of intended witnesses;
all relevant evidence; the existence of a felony conviction of any material witness;
and any exculpatory evidence. 27 Although Proposition 115 has no impact on a
defendant's automatic right to a transcript of the grand jury proceeding which led
to his indictment, 28 the new law clearly demonstrates California's rationale that
liberal criminal discovery and disclosure is better suited to ascertaining the truth
than a policy of continued secrecy.
Among the objectives of proposition 115, codified at Section 1054 of the
California Penal Code, are:
(a) To promote the ascertainment of truth in trials by requiring timely
pretrial discovery.
(b) To save court time by requiring that discovery be conducted informally
between the parties before judicial enforcement is required.
(c) To save court time in trial and avoid the necessity for frequent
interruptions and postponements.
(d) To protect victims and witnesses from danger, harassment, and undue
delay of the proceedings. 29
Added to the California Constitution was a provision declaring criminal discovery
in the state to be "reciprocal . . . [i]n order to provide for fair and speedy

trials.""30 These objectives are remarkably similar to the rationale offered by
Professor Peter Aranella, more than ten years before the passage of Proposition
115, for reforming the federal grand jury system to provide defendants with a copy
of the grand jury transcript immediately after indictment, and offer an insight into

Id. at 191.
125. Hobbs v. Municipal Court, 284 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
126. See id. at 687-88.
127. CAL PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (a)-(d) (West Supp. 1995).
128. In California, a defendant is entitled, after an indictment has been returned, to a copy of thi
transcript of the proceeding. CAL PENAL CODE § 938.1 (a) (West 1985).
129. CAL PENAL CODE § 1054 (a)-(d) (West Supp. 1995)
130. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 309 (Cal. 1991) (quoting CALIF. CONST,art. 1, § 30(c))
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31
what a more liberal disclosure approach could facilitate.1

V. A PROPOSED RULE
Although there have been repeated calls for reform of grand jury disclosure
rules, 13 2 most have achieved little success. The federal courts, and state courts

which follow the federal rules, seem unwilling to concede that the policy interests
behind the need for secrecy are significantly minimized by the return of an
indictment. Rather than permit a defendant automatic access to the testimony that
led to her indictment, these courts assume that the defendant cannot be trusted
with such information and continue to apply the "particularized need" standard.as
A comparison of the "particularized need" standard and the "presumptive right
rule" indicates that the two standards differ significantly in only one aspect; the
"particularized need" standard places the burden of proof on the defendant to
show a need of "compelling necessity," 1 3' while the "presumptive right" rule
places the burden on the prosecution to show why disclosure should not be granted.
The implication in this disparity is that, in placing the burden on the defendant,
the "particularized need" standard is applied with the assumption that the
defendant is guilty. 35
But in considering the multitude of procedural safeguards afforded the criminal
defendant, from questioning and arrest through trial,13" a procedural rule which
places the burden on the defendant before disclosure will be granted appears
inconsistent with the presumption that he is innocent until proven guilty.131 On the

131. See Aranella, supra note 102, at 572-75.
132. See id. at 572-85; Knudsen, supra note 2, at 441-42; David. W. Louisell. Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAtL L. REV. 56, 102-3 (1961); Murray & Conway, supra note 2, at 205-06;
Arthur H. Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L Ra,. 668. 683-84
(1962).
133. Calkins, supra note 2, at 30 ("Courts have so completely lost sight of the reasons underlying...
grand jury secrecy that they have even refused disclosure when the prosecution itself has lifted the veil of
secrecy and used the grand jury minutes to refresh ... its witnesses.").
134. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682.
135. Brennan, supra note 7, at 287.
136. See. e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting prosecution from using race as a
basis for excluding potential jurors); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 666 (1970) (right to impartial jury in
cases where offense charged carries prison term of more than six months); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1 (1968)
(reasonable articulable suspicion required for "stop and frisk"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 836 (1966)
(Mirandawarnings required prior to custodial interrogation).
137. Brennan, supra note 7, at 287 ("[D]oes not denial of... discovery set aside the presumption of
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contrary, a rule which allows "both the defendant and the State ample opportunity
to investigate ... [the] facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence"1 0
seems more consistent with the presumption of innocence than a rule which relies
on secrecy to protect against disclosure.
A better approach for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to follow for
the pretrial disclosure of grand jury testimony would be to accept the rationale of
the Colorado Supreme Court in Parlapianoand apply the "presumptive right"
rule. The "presumptive right" rule would afford the criminal defendant automatic
access, after indictment, to the testimony of any person whom the government
intends to call as a witness at trial. The Prosecutor could then rebut the
presumption by showing that there are valid reasons for continued secrecy, such as
continuing investigations against the defendant or others suspected of criminal
involvement with the defendant. Such a rule would lie somewhere in the middle of
the disclosure spectrum next to Colorado, sandwiched between the federal courts
on the right and the reciprocal discovery State of California on the left, and would
benefit the criminal justice system in several ways.
The first benefit would be to minimize the time wasted on a court's
determination of "particularized need," as well as the subsequent appeals that
follow a denial of disclosure.1 9 As discussed previously, the majority of
"particularized need" analysis centers on the time consuming task of determining
whether the defendant has met the burden of showing that his need for the
transcript outweighs the concern for grand jury secrecy. "1 0 Automatic disclosure
would save the court time by providing for discovery without requiring extensive
judicial intervention.
Second, disclosure would provide defense counsel with the pertinent information
from which he can best determine the "desirability of plea-negotiations." 14
' This
would enable the defendant and his counsel to better measure the likelihood of
conviction by a jury and perhaps place a greater emphasis on resolution before
42
trial .

innocence-is not such denial blind to the superlatively important public interest in the acquittal of the
innocent? To shackle [defense] counsel so that he cannot effectively seek out the truth and afford the accused
representation which is not his privilege but his absolute right seems seriously to imperil the bedrock
presumption of innocence.").
138. State v. Davis, 624 P.2d 376, 379 (Haw. 1981).
139. See Aranella, supra note 102, at 574 (1980).
140. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
141. Aranella, supra note 102, at 574.
142. Id. at 575. See also Brennan, supra note 7, at 287 ("For if voluntary disclosure to defense counsel
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Third, disclosure would permit the defendant to know the testimony upon which
his indictment was founded and to prepare his defense in order to respond to that
testimony, as well as any other evidence against him.143 This benefit relates back to
the view that access by both parties to the same information is more likely to
result in the proper administration of justice.144
Fourth, because of the limited access to the grand jury afforded by the secrecy
of the proceedings, access to transcripts of grand jury testimony also might provide
information relevant for use as a check on the prosecutor's relationship to the
grand jury by detecting prosecutorial misconduct or abuse where it occurs. 1
A presumptive right rule would provide the defendant with automatic access to
the transcript of the grand jury testimony that led to his indictment. But by
allowing the prosecution to show cause why disclosure should not be granted, the
court would still be in a position to safeguard the historical policy interests that
might be pertinent after an indictment has been returned. For example, where
there are ongoing grand jury proceedings, it is possible that information disclosed
to the indicted defendant might alert other targets of the grand jury and thus
jeopardize the government's investigation or enable targets to flee. In this instance,
however, the trial judge could hold an in camera inspection of the transcript to
ensure that only the minimum information necessary to the defendant is disclosed.
The rebuttable presumption would also allow the prosecution to block disclosure,
or limit it accordingly, where there is sufficient evidence to believe that the
defendant may pose a serious threat to the safety of witnesses.
In Davis v. United States, however, these concerns, as well as the other policy
interests previously discussed were not implicated. Had the court applied a
"presumptive right" rule, Davis would have been entitled to a copy of his alibi
witness's grand jury testimony, unless the prosecution could have shown cause as
to why disclosure should not be granted. Had that been the case, it is difficult to
see how disclosure would not have been ordered by the court. Davis was the only
suspect arrested and accused of the charges, thus disclosure would not have
jeopardized any subsequent government investigation. 140 Intimidating witnesses
would not have been a concern of the court because only the testimony of Davis's
. . . results in guilty pleas because defense counsel becomes convinced of the hopelessness of the client's cause,
should not a rule authorizing criminal discovery in every case result in even more dispositions without trial.").
143. People v. Pipes, 3 Cal. Rptr. 814, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (characterizing objective of disclosure
rule as "to enable him to know the testimony upon which the charge is founded and to make his dcfcnse").
144. See supra notes 7-8.
145. See Aranella, supra note 102, at 575.
146. Davis, 641 A.2d at 487.
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alibi witness, a witness for the defense, would have been disclosed. The fear that
Davis might alter his testimony to be consistent with the testimony of Ms. Mosby,
while possible, should not have been a serious concern stemming from disclosure,
because Ms. Mosby would probably share her testimony with Davis anyway.
Moreover, disclosure would not have subjected Davis to public scrutiny any greater
than that caused by his indictment and subsequent public trial. The information
contained in the transcript would not have prompted or enabled Davis to flee
because he was held without bail prior to trial. 147 Finally, Davis's incarceration
prior to trial may also have significantly hampered his ability to intimidate or
tamper with witnesses. 4 8 What effect, if any, the transcript would have had on the
outcome of the trial, however, is a matter of speculation.
But the Davis court did not apply a "presumptive right" rule. Instead the court
applied the particularized need" standard and denied disclosure when only the
interest of "preventing the subornation of perjury""P-a 315 year-old policy
interest the defendant could not possibly rebut-was pertinent to the court's
analysis. Analysis of the five policy interests demonstrates that the standard is of
more historical significance than legal significance, existing to serve "[s]ecrecy for
secrecy's sake."' 5 0 But logic suggests that a rule must be grounded upon
reason-reason which will enable it to sustain the test of time, not exist simply to
honor it.' 5' The "particularized need" standard is not such a rule.

CONCLUSION

In light of the historical development of the grand jury and the policy interests
which govern the secrecy requirements attached to it, the "particularized need"
standard is not the most adequate safeguard by which the rights of the defendant,
the State, the witnesses, and the grand jurors can be protected. As evidenced by
California, Colorado, and the several other states permitting liberal access to
grand jury transcripts, a rule which provides the defendant with an automatic
right to grand jury transcripts will not necessarily lead to the realization of the
fears of those who oppose liberal disclosure. On the contrary, a disclosure rule
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
certainly

Brief for Appellant at 25, Davis (No. 92-CF-1317).
See supra note 102.
Davis, 641 A.2d at 492; see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
Parlapiano, 491 P.2d at 968.
See Calkins, supra note 73, at 458 ("If valid reasons for a policy (of secrecy] no longer exist,
any requirement to pursue that policy should terminate.").
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which allows the State to rebut automatic access to grand jury transcripts permits
the defendant to better investigate the facts that lead to his indictment, provides a
check on the prosecution's control over the grand jury, and is more consistent with
the presumption of innocence; but still prevents the defendant from undermining
the historical policy interests embedded in the development of the grand jury.

